Introduction
Th e aim of this contribution is to take part in the largely debated question whether eff ective remedy is provided for victims of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).
Euphemistically, in cases in which respect and protection of the civilian population is not ensured, states tend to speak of "collateral damages," a military jargon designating the wounding or the killing of civilians and the damage of their private goods as a consequence of military operations. In this book it has been often recalled that, despite their diff erent historical backgrounds and their own normative specifi cities, the central concern of human rights law and humanitarian law is "human dignity." 2 May such a "common ground" be a valid basis for assessing eff ective and valid compensation for damage to "alleged victims" of any "grave" violations of human rights and humanitarian law?
Th e two cases under examination are an outstanding example of the complexity of the problem of ensuring an eff ective remedy when provisions of international humanitarian law are breached. Neither domestic courts and tribunals, nor the intervention of the Strasbourg Court -the organ established to supervise and implement the European system of protection of human rights -off ered a valid safeguard. Should we conclude that complementarity between the two systems, as far as the use of protection tools is concerned, is possible only theoretically?
